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Abstract. To protect privacy in large systems, users must be able to authenticate against a 
central server without disclosing their identity to the network. Private identification pro-
tocols based on public key cryptography cannot be implemented on small devices like 
RFID tags and are computationally expensive for the backend server. Symmetric key pro-
tocols, on the other hand, provide only modest levels of privacy, but can cheaply be ex-
ecuted on servers and implemented on devices. The privacy of these symmetric-key pri-
vacy protocols derives from the fact that an attacker only ever knows a small fraction of 
the keys in a system while the legitimate reader knows all keys. This gap in knowledge 
can be widened by adding noise to user responses. The noise blurs the borders between 
groups of users that the attacker would otherwise be able to distinguish. We evaluate the 
effectiveness and cost of this randomization and find that the information leakage from 
the tree protocol can be decreased by 99.9% at a 150x increase in the number of hashing 
operations. Any degree of privacy up to that of public key protocols can be reached while 
staying well below the cost of public key cryptography. Our technique integrates particu-
larly well with the HB family of protocols, which can be used as an already randomized 
hash function in our scheme. 
1  Introduction 
The need for an ever-growing number of small devices and tokens to identify or authenticate 
creates a permanent threat to privacy. To preserve privacy, users must be able to identify them-
selves to a legitimate server without disclosing their identity to unauthorized readers. Private 
identification can be achieved through public key cryptography. Public key encryption, how-
ever, cannot be implemented on small devices. Hardware implementations of public key ci-
phers are at least six orders of magnitude less efficient than symmetric primitives such as block 
ciphers, stream ciphers, and hash functions. Radio-readable credit cards are an example of a 
large-scale system whose current lack of privacy protection has recently attracted attention [5]. 
The resource constraints of touch-less credit cards and the increasingly large number of issued 
cards require a privacy solution that scales gracefully and comes at little extra cost per card. 
Privacy protocols specifically designed to support the area, power, and scalability constraints 
of large RFID systems have repeatedly be shown to disclose too much information [1, 12].  
 
The tree protocol was proposed for low-security RFID applications such as retail logistics, 
where readings are frequent and data has to be available instantly. Credit card transactions, on 
the other hand, already involve extensive computation needed for processing and fraud detec-
tion. Privacy protocols for credit cards can hence be more expensive for the backend server. We propose a new randomized protocol that fills the gap between RFID privacy protocols and 
public key protocols. Through parameterization, our protocol can reach any point on the trade-
off curve between scalability and privacy that lies between current RFID protocols and public 
key protocols as illustrated in Figure 1. Our protocol improves upon a tree-based RFID privacy 
protocol in which each user is assigned several secrets, many of which are shared with some of 
the other users. An attacker who steals some of the secrets can begin to distinguish groups of 
users. We improve the privacy of the tree protocol by flipping a random set of bits in user mes-
sages.  A legitimate reader that knows the secrets of all users may need to evaluate several tree 
branches, but always finds the correct match. 
 
In this paper, we analyze the trade-off between added work for the legitimate reader and im-
proved privacy. Using an entropy-based metric, we measure privacy as the amount of informa-
tion leaked to the attacker for different degrees of randomizations. We evaluate the feasibility 
of our approach by analyzing the running time of our protocol on dedicated hardware and find 
that it performs better than public key cryptography even for very large systems up to one bil-
lion users. Our protocol can, therefore, provide privacy even for the largest, most ubiquitous 
computing and sensor network applications. Furthermore, unlike public key cryptosystems, it 
can be implemented on RFID tags, as it only requires a random number generator and a one-
way function. 
2  Background 
The problem of private identification has been extensively studied in the context of RFID tags. 
Solutions have been proposed that provide provable privacy, but cause extensive computation-
al overhead on the backend server [16]. Other protocols that are more easily implemented than 
these sacrifice either availability or strong privacy. Those protocols with limited availability 
maintain and synchronously update some shared state on tag and server side [13]. Too many 
unauthorized read attempts bring this state out of sync and if the chain of pre-computed states 
is exceeded, the tag is effectively lost from the database. The other possible trade-off for more 
scalability sacrifices some privacy by sharing secrets among different users. Only by giving up 
some privacy, all required properties of identification systems such as scalability and availabil-
ity can be provided. In this paper, we are extending one such protocol by Molnar and Wagner 
 
Figure 1. Privacy-cost design space of existing protocols and new randomized tree protocols that stores keys in a tree of secrets and improve its privacy substantially [9]. Their protocol 
along with some of its proposed modifications is described in Section 3.2. 
 
The challenge of scalable cryptography has previously been addressed in several contexts. The 
problem of preventing piracy in multicast networks such as Pay-TV has a very different threat 
model, but is conceptually close to the question we are considering. One protocol proposed in 
this context that also uses a tree of secrets allows for counterfeit Pay-TV cards to be linked to 
the subscriber that leaked access information [14]. The best setup that assigns the smallest 
number of keys to each user while still being scalable is derived using an entropy-based metric 
similar to the one we are using. 
 
Our approach uses randomization to enhance privacy. Randomization for the sake of privacy is 
also found in privacy-preserving data mining. In these schemes, data sets that contain sensitive 
information are perturbed in a way that preserve some statistical values of large subsets of the 
database but eliminate all private information of individual data items. Whether these tech-
niques can successfully preserve enough information for more than just a few specific queries 
while providing sufficient privacy is an open research question. Our work is orthogonal to 
these works as we are providing a way to privately send an identifier that can be used to look 
up information from databases, but are not considering how to privately release these datasets. 
 
Randomizing responses has previously been used to achieve privacy in RFID systems in the 
HB family of protocols that were originally developed by Nicholas Hopper and Manual Blum 
to support authentication by humans without computer assistance [6]. These protocols use only 
very basic mathematical operations to create a hash function. To achieve one-wayness in this 
type of hash function and prevent an attacker from recovering the secret key, some of the re-
sponse bits have to be randomly flipped. The hardness of the HB hash functions relies on the 
learning parity with noise (LPN) problem which has not conclusively been shown to be hard. 
A first attempt to make the HB protocols secure against active attackers was proven secure in a 
limited attacker model [8], but later shown to be vulnerable against very practical attacks that 
are outside of the scope of the proofs [2]. In this man-in-the-middle attack, the attacker flips 
bits in challenges send by a legitimate reader to a tag and learns key bits from observing 
whether or not the protocol succeeds [2]. Improved variants of the function have not yet re-
ceived sufficient scrutiny to assess their security [10]. If a secure hash function can be built 
based on LPN, this function would provide the perfect base for our randomization technique. 
Instead of adding noise to the hash output, the HB hash functions already add noise to be se-
cure. 
3  Private Identification Protocol 
In various applications, including radio-enabled credit cards, protocols are needed to protect 
the user’s privacy, while making it hard to impersonate other users or to counterfeit identifica-
tion tokens. At the same time, the protocols must be efficiently implementable on the tokens 
and must not lead to prohibitive computational overhead on the backend server. 3.1  Definition 
A protocol is considered private if no reasonably powerful attacker is able to distinguish be-
tween different users of the system with more than very small probability. The attacker we are 
protecting against is able to compromise a large (yet limited) number of tokens.  
 
Let P(k,r) be the output of an identification protocol with secret key k and random nonce r. For 
all polynomial time distinguishers, D(∙), there exists a bound, , on the probability that two us-
ers with different keys can be distinguished, which is described by the following game: 
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(1) 
In the game, the distinguisher is asked to label two different cases. In the first case, one secret 
key and two random nonces are chosen at random1 and the protocol is run twice with the same 
key but different nonces. In the second case, two keys and nonces are randomly chosen and the 
protocol is run on different keys and nonces. In each case, the distinguisher only gets to see the 
random nonces and the protocol output but not the secret keys. The distinguisher then has to 
decide whether a given quadruple was generated from two different secrets (in which case it 
outputs ‘0’) or using one secret (in which case it outputs ‘1’). The advantage, , with which the 
best distinguisher can tell the two cases apart corresponds to the maximum probability with 
which an attacker can distinguish two different users on average. 
 
For a protocol to be considered private, we need  to be small. Analogous to perfect secrecy 
[15], we define a protocol to provide perfect privacy if and only if the attacker advantage de-
creases faster than any polynomial in the key length, n; that is:   1/p(n), over all polynomial 
functions p(n). Even though the value  represents the privacy of a system, there is no fixed 
threshold that would separate private from not private, but rather different values for different 
scenarios. Instead of arbitrarily creating such a bound, we provide a way of measuring privacy 
through our previously introduced metric for information leakage [12]. Based on this measure, 
the designer of a system will have to decide what level of privacy is required (and affordable). 
Our metric enables protocol designers to estimate the trade-off between scalability and infor-
mation leakage. The conversion between information leakage and -privacy is as follows: 
 
Information leakage measures how accurately an attacker can distinguish groups of users. It is 
calculated as the average entropy of the group sizes. This entropy is computed as: 

L  pi log2
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where pi is the fraction of users in the ith group. If, for example, an attacker can distinguish 3 
groups  of  25,  25,  and  50  users,  the  average  information  leakage  is 
L=2·¼·log2(4)+½·log2(2)=1.5 bits. The attacker advantage, , can be expressed in terms of this 
                                                            
1 Un is a value randomly chosen from the uniform distribution over all strings of length n. information leakage [12]. If on average x bits of information is learned from users of a system, 
the attacker advantage of distinguishing two users is the probability that these users do not 
share the same x bit identifier; that is: 

 
1
2
x  
(2) 
If the users are evenly distributed over 2
x groups, each user is in a group of size 2
-xN and  is 
this bound. If the groups are distributed differently,  is larger. If, for example, there exists 
groups of two sizes, (2
-x+)N and (2
-x-)N, then =2
-x+2
2. As long as the deviation from the 
uniform distribution, , is small the attacker advantage is very close to the bound described by 
Equation 2. Given this conversion between information leakage and attacker advantage, we 
can estimate the -privacy of an information source by measuring its information leakage. 
 
In addition to privacy, a private identification protocol must also provide correctness, which 
requires that given the nonces and outputs of the above game, and also the set of all keys in the 
system, the key or keys corresponding to the nonces and outputs can easily be found. For sca-
lability, the search for the correct key should be fast (sub-linear in N) on average. 
 
For a protocol to also provide authentication, an attacker must not be able to spoof a user’s re-
sponse without knowing the user’s secret keys, even after seeing many of the user’s responses 
to observed or even chosen challenges. Authentication follows trivially from private identifica-
tion in the tree protocol (explained in the next section) by adding a server-chosen nonce. In this 
paper, although we concentrate on improving private identification, all results apply equally to 
private authentication, because our approach only alters the higher levels of the tree, while au-
thentication only happens at the lowest level of the tree. 
3.2  Deterministic Tree Protocol 
Several RFID privacy protocols have been proposed, all of which sacrifice scalability, availa-
bility, or strong privacy. In the basic hash protocol, each user has a unique key. When queried, 
the user responds with a random nonce and the keyed hash of that random number:  
H(N, k), N 
where H(,) is a one-way function and N is a random nonce. To identify the user, the server 
hashes the nonce under all keys in the database until it finds a match. The basic hash protocol 
provides perfect privacy (e.g.,  < 1/p(n) over all polynomial functions, p(n)) but does not scale 
well [16] and the computational overhead is prohibitive for large systems. 
 
In the more scalable tree protocol, several secrets are assigned to each user [9]. The secrets are 
structured in a tree with the users as the tree leaves. A user ti is assigned the secrets si,1, si,2, …, 
si,d where d is the depth of the tree (all secrets but the last are shared with some of the other us-
ers). When queried, the user responds with  
H(si,1, N1), N1, H(si,2, N2), N2, …, H(si,d, Nd), Nd The database executes the basic hash protocol for each tree level to find the secret used on 
each level. Once a leaf is reached, the path from the root to the leaf uniquely identifies the us-
er. This tree-based hash protocol scales well beyond billions of users. The drawback of the 
protocol, however, is that secrets are shared among several users and extracting the secrets 
from some users potentially allows tracking others. An attacker can uniquely identify a user 
with higher probability when more secrets of that user are known. In the standard tree protocol, 
a tree with a constant branching factor at each level is used. In previous work, we showed that 
varying the branching factor for the different levels improves privacy [11]. We also showed 
that a rational attacker would be mostly interested in the high information disclosure from the 
few users in small groups, while the value of data collected from all other users is relatively 
low. We consequently proposed to structure the tree in a way that avoids small groups. In this 
paper, we assume this already optimized version of the tree protocol and further improve its 
privacy through randomization. 
3.3  Randomized Tree Protocol 
To improve the tree protocol we add noise to the hashes generated by the user to decrease in-
formation leakage from the user. Information leakage is caused by the fact that the attacker can 
learn some of the secrets in the tree. In a tree with two levels where the secrets on the first lev-
el are shared and the secrets on the second level are unique to each user, an attacker can steal 
as many as all of the shared secrets (e.g., √N secrets in a two-level tree with constant spreading 
factor). To improve privacy, we need to increase the size of the groups that the users are hiding 
in without increasing the workload for the users and with only reasonably increasing the work-
load of the backend server. A somewhat higher server workload is acceptable in systems where 
transactions already involve extensive computation. One such application is credit card trans-
actions where book-keeping and fraud-protection are already computationally costly opera-
tions. While we argue that somewhat higher workloads are reasonable, we still believe that the 
computational overhead of public key cryptography would be prohibitive for both device and 
server. We therefore propose a design space that provides options for these scenarios. Rando-
mization provides cost and design choices anywhere in between the deterministic tree-protocol 
and public key cryptography. 
 
Our technique is simple: some bits of the user-generated hashes are randomly flipped before 
being send to the server. To enable legitimate readers to still uniquely identify (and strictly au-
thenticate if a reader nonce is incorporated) each user, the last level of the tree is not rando-
mized. Where before an attacker could deterministically identify a user as being a member of a 
single group, the randomization probabilistically places the user in several groups. Randomiza-
tion amplified the information gap between the legitimate reader that knows all the secrets and 
the attacker who only knows a small fraction of the secrets. 
 
A simple instantiation of our randomization technique would proceed as follows: The user ge-
nerates a nonce, then hashes that nonce under its secret key, and finally flips every bit of the 
result with some probability p. Any response could hence have been generated by any user 
with some probability. If p is chosen too close to ½ even the legitimate reader has no advan-
tage over trying random keys until the right one is found. If p is chosen properly, however, the 
legitimate reader only has to try a few groups to find the right user while an attacker is left with a large uncertainty as to which group the user is in. The next section provides one possi-
ble search strategy for the reader and analyzes its cost overhead as a function of the degree of 
randomization. 
 
If an attacker can learn several responses that are known to come from the same user, the effect 
of the randomization is diminished, potentially to the point where the randomized tree protocol 
does not provide better privacy than its deterministic version. For the randomization to be ef-
fective, the user, therefore,  needs to respond with the same message when queried multiple 
times in the same location, but should respond with different messages when queried in differ-
ent locations. This behavior can be achieved for RFID tags through storing the once-computed 
and randomized hash in capacitor backed RAM. Once the tag has been out of the reader field 
for some time, the capacitor is depleted and the stored value is lost. A new hash is then gener-
ated on the next query. This will mostly prevent an attacker from learning several responses 
that are known to be from the same user. 
4  Analysis 
Randomizing responses lowers the information leakage, decreases the chance of a successful 
identification through a rogue reader, and improves privacy. At the same time, the potential 
ambiguity of the response can cause extra work for a legitimate verifier. While the legitimate 
reader will always be able to correctly identify a card, some wrong tree branches might be eva-
luated before the correct branch. The randomization never leads to false identifications, be-
cause the last round that used the unique secret of the card is not randomized.  
 
This section presents the trade-off between lower information leakage and increased workload. 
We also introduce a slight modification of the randomization that greatly extends the design 
space of possible trade-offs. 
4.1  Information Leakage 
The amount of information learned from the tree protocol depends on the tree setup, the set of 
secrets known to the attacker, and the position of the identifier in the tree [12]. If no secrets are 
known to an attacker, any read could have originated from any of N users and the attacker fac-
es log2 N bits of uncertainty as to which user it might be. As secrets are disclosed to the attack-
er, the users can be placed in groups of varying sizes. A user in a group of size g can be identi-
fied with uncertainty log2 p. We define the loss in uncertainty log2 N – log2 p = log2 (N/p) as 
information leakage. The average information leakage of the tree protocol for large numbers of 
broken secrets in large systems with up to billions of users is typically below 7 bits [12]. 
 
In the deterministic tree protocol, an attacker can test which of the stolen secrets any user pos-
sesses. The randomization blurs this border and the attacker can instead only decide with what 
probability a known secret was used to generate a given response. When randomizing the re-
sponse, the probabilities that different keys have generated a given response become more 
equal, which lowers the information leakage. 
 
We analyze the information leakage from the first level of a two-level tree. As the secrets on the second level are unique, no information is leaked from this level. We will further assume 
the strongest possible attacker who knows all secrets on the first level but none of the second 
level.  
 
Figure 2 depicts the probability distribution that reflects where in the tree a given user resides 
as seen by an attacker. Since the attacker knows all secrets on the first level of the tree, each 
user can be placed into one of the tree branches when using the deterministic tree protocol. 
This decreases the number of possible tree positions from N to N/k and leaks log2 k bits of in-
formation, where k is the spreading factor on the first tree level. For the randomized tree, on 
the other hand, the attacker only learns with what probability the user resides in the different 
branches.  
 
The value of entropy (and information leakage) depends on the probability that the correct se-
cret was used, a1, the probability that another secret was used, a2, and the number of secrets, k. 
The entropy of the distribution is: 
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r k
r
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where r is the ratio of the probabilities that the right or a wrong secret was used, r=a1/a2. The 
border cases r=1, and r=∞ correspond to the linear protocol (no information leaked) and the 
tree protocol (completely deterministic grouping of users). The derivation of Equation 3 is giv-
en in Appendix A. 
 
Note that the probability distribution shown in the Figure 2 depicts the average probabilities 
over all possible user responses; for most responses the distribution will be very different. On 
average, a1 will always be larger than a2, but an attacker cannot easily distinguish between the 
two groups given only a single response. 
 
The different amounts of information leakage achieved by varying the degree of randomization 
are shown in Figure 3. The amount of disclosed information decreased roughly exponentially 
 
Figure 2. Probability distribution of user location as seen by attacker compared for de-
terministic and random tree protocol. Tree with N users, spreading factor k. with the degree of randomization (and the attacker advantage, , decreases roughly linearly). 
For high levels of randomization, the information leakage drops to virtually zero. Next, we 
analyze the cost associated with adding noise. 
4.2  Verification overhead 
The verification overhead for the legitimate server grows as more bits of the user’s responses 
are randomized, as shown in Figure 5. In the unmodified tree protocol with a tree of height d 
and spreading factor k, an average number of ½∙k∙d hashing operations are needed for every 
identification. In the very unlikely worst case, the entire tree is evaluated for a single identifi-
cation (a sensible implementation would avoid needing to search the entire tree for a bad read 
by cutting off the search once the probability drops below some threshold). To calculate the 
expected additional cost of the randomization, we simulated the server workload for a large 
number of possible parameters. We choose a simple search strategy for the server in which the 
branches are evaluated based on their initial probability of containing the match. We choose 
this search strategy merely for its simplicity, while more adaptive strategies would perhaps 
lead to lower costs (in particular, when deeper trees are used).  
 
The degree to which privacy is improved through randomization varies with the height of the 
tree. It is largest for shallow trees, mainly because a smaller fraction of the levels is rando-
mized (the last level is never randomized). We have previously shown that duo-level trees 
have better privacy than deeper trees and are therefore the preferred setup for our randomiza-
tion [11]. The opportunity to increase privacy by decreasing the height of the tree should hence 
be fully exhausted before adding randomization, as this usually provides a better trade-off be-
tween cost and privacy. 
  
We find that the average cost grows roughly exponentially according to the degree of randomi-
zation as depicted in Figure 3. Since information leakage decreases exponentially with rando-
 
Figure 3. Workload required for one identification in deterministic tree with no rando-
mization vs. randomized tree. System with 1 billion users, tree with depth 2. Average 
values over 100k simulations each. mization, the trade-off between information leakage and cost provided by the simple randomi-
zation is roughly linear.  
 
The randomized tree protocol provides design choices that span the whole range of privacy and 
scalability options between the linear protocol and the deterministic tree protocol. The design 
space is described by the trade-off between randomization and information leakage as depicted 
in Figure 3 and the trade-off between randomization and cost in Figure 5. The resulting trade-
off curve is shown in Figure 4b. In all the figures, we assume a large system with one billion 
users and a tree with two levels. The next section provides an enhanced randomization that 
skews this trade-off towards more privacy.  
4.3  Selective Randomization 
To reach more points in the design space, many of which are superior to what the simple ran-
domization can achieve, we introduce an extension to the randomization scheme. In this selec-
tive randomization, we first select a fixed size subset of bits and then flip each bit in this set 
with a certain probability. On each read, we select a new set of p1∙n of the n bits for randomiza-
tion and then flip each of these bits with probability p2. The simple randomization analyzed 
previously corresponds to the case where p1=1. The selective randomization leads to a distribu-
tion with the same expected value as the simple randomization when flipping bits with proba-
bility p1∙p2, but the actual distribution is more concentrated around the center. In particular, no 
value with more than p1∙n flipped bits can be assumed. This constraint helps the attacker in that 
some users are known to not have generated some responses. For well-chosen p1 and p2, how-
ever, the probability that at least a few of the wrong secrets could have generated any given re-
sponse is very high. We calculated the amounts of entropy that the selective randomization 
preserves and simulated the expected cost for many choices of p1 and p2.  
The resulting design space of additional cost versus decreased information leakage is depicted 
in Figure 4b. Possible points of the design space include one where information leakage is 98% 
   
(a)  (b) 
 
Figure 4. Design space for  (a) selective randomization and (b) simple randomization 
(p1=1) and. System with one billion users, two-level tree. Values are averaged over 100k 
simulations each. lower and cost increases 22 times (p1=0.8, p2=0.25) and another point where 99.96% less in-
formation is disclosed and cost is up 304 times (p1=0.8, p2=0.35). 
5  Feasibility 
The randomized tree-based hash protocol provides good scalability while leaking very little in-
formation. In this section, we quantify the cost and privacy of the protocol for a popular scena-
rio and estimate the resources needed to operate it. 
 
In our scenario, we assume a system with one billion tokens (e.g., RFID tags in credit cards), 
each of which knows two secrets: one from the first level of a tree that is shared with some of 
the other tags and a unique secret on the second level. For simplicity, we assume that the 
spreading factor is the same on both levels at about 31,000. The attacker is assumed to know 
all the secrets on the first level. 
 
The cost overhead of the privacy protection offered by the randomized tree protocol has so far 
been measured normalized to the cost of the deterministic tree protocol. We translate this ab-
stract measure into concrete running time on dedicated hardware and compare this cost to that 
of public key cryptography. To operate the reader-side of the tree protocol, only a hash func-
tion is needed. This hash neither needs to provide collision-resistance nor needs to have partic-
ularly long keys as long as finding keys is significantly more expensive than other ways to 
compromise privacy.  
 
In the deterministic key protocol, the reader computes 31,000 hashes on average for each read. 
The randomization increases this workload by a factor by 304 to 10 million hashing operations 
and lowers the information leakage by 99.96%.  
 
 
Figure 5. Workload required by different protocols for each identification. System 
with 1 billion users, tree with depth 2. Values are averaged over 100k simulations 
each. Hardware implementations of AES achieve about 30 million operations per second per core, 
about 20 of which fit on a single high-end FPGA chip [3]. As some level of protection is al-
ready sacrificed in symmetric protocols to make them scalable, ciphers less strong than AES 
might well provide sufficient protection. Smaller algorithm such as Tiny Encryption Algorithm 
(TEA) and its relatives XTEA and XXTEA can be implemented more efficient in the same 
hardware and perhaps provide a better fit for RFID tags [7]. Efficient ciphers such as A5/1 
achieve up to 2 billion operations per second on a single FPGA2.    
 
Yet another alternative are HB protocols that can potentially build a one -way function  [8]. 
Since these hash functions only require very basic arithmetic operations, the implementation 
overhead on an RFID tag is virtually zero. An HB hash would, however, require a significant 
number of rounds for each hashing operation and hence have a high communication  overhead. 
This overhead is acceptable in applications such as building access control where identification 
may take up to a second.  
 
In comparison to symmetric one -way functions, public key cryptography such as Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography or RSA is much m ore expensive in hardware. One high -end FPGA fits 
about 10 instances of RSA that each compute about 30 operations per second  [4]. RSA is 
hence about two million times less efficient than AE S and seven million times less efficient 
than A5/1. On the other hand, only a single RSA operation is required for each authentication. 
One identification using public key cryptography, therefore, is as efficient in hardware as the 
tree protocol with two million AES hashing operations, which also is the cost for decreasing 
the information leakage of the tree protocol by 99%. If this level of privacy is sufficient, then 
all symmetric ciphers that are more efficient than AES are clearly superior to RSA in terms of 
reader workload. Furthermore, in all application in which larger amounts of information le a-
kage is tolerable, the randomized tree protocol constitutes the only available design option to 
trade some privacy for less cost. 
6  Conclusions 
The need for private identification can be satisfied within the constraints of small devices and 
large systems. The proposed protocols are based on symmetric cryptography, so they provide 
privacy only heuristically, not provably. To assess the effectiveness of these protocols, privacy 
must be measured in a metric that models the actual privacy threat. Information leakage, the 
measure of lost entropy in a system, is one such metric that captures how well an attacker can 
distinguish between different users of a system. 
 
Randomization of responses is an effective design trade-off that increases the workload of the 
reader as much as it lowers the amount of information leakage. The trade-off provides a large 
number of design choices for different scenarios, all of which are cheaper than public key 
cryptography on the reader side and much cheaper on the tag side.  
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Appendix A 
In this appendix, we derive the amount of information leakage through the randomized tree 
protocol. Information leakage is defined as the average amount of lost entropy in the distribu-
tion of probabilities with which different users could have generated a given response. In the 
linear hash protocol and in public key protocols, this entropy is log N and the information lea-
kage is virtually zero because all users could have generated a response with probability very close to 1/N, where N is the number of users in the system. For the deterministic tree protocol 
with two levels of secrets, the first of which is completely disclosed to an attacker, the entropy 
is log N – log k and the information leakage is log k, where k is the number of branches of the 
first tree level. 
 
In the randomized tree protocol, an attacker never learns the exact branch a user resides in but 
rather a probability distribution over the different branches as was illustrated in Figure 2. On 
average, the correct branch will have a higher probability than any of the wrong branches 
(which all have the same probability). The amount of lost entropy (and information leakage) 
only depends on the difference of these two probabilities. 
 
The entropy of the overall distribution is the weighted sum of the entropies of the tree branch 
that the user resides in, E1, and the entropy of all other branches, E2: 
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. 
 
The first term, log(N), is the entropy of the prior distribution; the first two terms describe the 
entropy of the deterministic tree protocol; and the remaining two terms describe the entropy 
gain through randomization. 